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Abstract
Background: The majority of human errors in healthcare originate from cognitive errors or biases. There is dearth
of evidence around relative prevalence and significance of various cognitive errors amongst doctors in their first
post-graduate year. This study was conducted with the objective of using high fidelity clinical simulation as a tool
to study the relative occurrence of selected cognitive errors amongst doctors in their first post-graduate year.
Methods: Intern simulation sessions on acute clinical problems, conducted in year 2014, were reviewed by two
independent assessors with expertise in critical care. The occurrence of cognitive errors was identified using Likert
scale based questionnaire and think-aloud technique. Teamwork and leadership skills were assessed using Ottawa
Global Rating Scale.
Results: The most prevalent cognitive errors included search satisfying (90%), followed by premature closure (PC)
(78.6%), and anchoring (75.7%). The odds of occurrence of various cognitive errors did not change with time during
internship, in contrast to teamwork and leadership skills (x2 = 11.9, P = 0.01). Anchoring appeared to be significantly
associated with delay in diagnoses (P = 0.007) and occurrence of PC (P = 0.005). There was a negative association
between occurrence of confirmation bias and the ability to make correct diagnosis (P = 0.05).
Conclusions: Our study demonstrated a high prevalence of anchoring, premature closure, and search satisfying
amongst doctors in their first post-graduate year, using high fidelity simulation as a tool. The occurrence of selected
cognitive errors impaired clinical performance and their prevalence did not change with time.
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Background
There has been increasing impetus worldwide on pre-
venting medical errors, which have been estimated to be
one of the leading contributors to poor outcome including
mortality [1]. An important type of medical error concern
diagnosis and clinical decision making, since they are
highly prevalent, often preventable, and generally lead to
greater morbidity and mortality than other types of error
[2]. In fact, the majority of complaints brought against
emergency physicians arise from delayed or missed diag-
noses [3]. These errors in diagnosis and clinical decision
making have been shown to arise due to technical/
knowledge deficits, system related factors or cognitive
errors. Of these cognitive errors have been shown to be
major contributors (in more than three fourths of errors
involving diagnosis and clinical decision making) [4, 5].
Cognitive errors may stem from inappropriate applica-
tion or complete failure to apply knowledge or subopti-
mal ‘cognitive dispositions to respond’ (CDR) or biases
[4, 6, 7]. The term CDR has been suggested to replace
the term ‘bias’, to remove the negative connotations as-
sociated with the later [8]. These biases represent the
manner in which a physician orientates and responds to
the presenting complaints, symptoms and signs under
circumstances of uncertainty [8]. Cognitive biases can
prompt clinicians to make errors when pruning, selecting
and/or validating a diagnosis resulting in missed/wrong
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diagnoses and treatment [6, 9–15]. There are several fac-
tors which predispose to cognitive errors such as fatigue
and sleep deprivation, affective state, patient factors,
ambient conditions and past experiences [8].
The cognitive errors have been studied extensively in
high-stakes safety industry such as aviation [16, 17].
However, in the medical literature the focus has been
relatively recent [6, 18–22]. Also, the evidence on cogni-
tive errors largely originates from studies on speciality
trainees, and reveal that practicing physicians and
trainees demonstrate considerable susceptibility to vari-
ous cognitive errors. The initial post graduate years in-
volve a sharp learning curve [23], wherein foundations
of their non-technical and technical skills are laid with
implications on their future performance. Therefore,
identifying the common cognitive errors and how they
impact performance can help prioritising them for fo-
cused interventions [24, 25]. In the absence of a formal
training in the current curriculum, clinical experience
alone would have to be relied on to attenuate the harm-
ful effects of cognitive errors. However, whether this is
the case, and to what extent is unknown.
To study cognitive errors in medicine, doctors are usu-
ally made to engage in cognitive tasks of diagnosis synthe-
sis and decision making under experimental conditions.
The majority of studies have used case notes and low-
fidelity computer screen-based simulations to engage doc-
tors in these cognitive tasks. The degree of immersion,
cognitive, physical and affective load imposed by widely
used methods of case notes and computer screen-based
simulations, is different from what doctors experience in
real life setting [26, 27]. Although there is controversy as
to the learning efficacy of low versus high-fidelity simula-
tion; [28] for research studies on cognitive errors, the
latter may be better suited [27, 29–31]. Hence, clinical
problems, recreated in a high-fidelity simulated environ-
ment, with engineered complexity, uncertainty and tem-
poral demands, is likely to reflect the real life challenges
more closely. Observing and interviewing doctors who
immerse and engage with patients and other staff in such
an environment provides an opportunity for assessment of
various technical and non-technical skills including diag-
nosis synthesis and decision making [32]. Occurrence of
various cognitive errors and their impact on diagnosis syn-
thesis and decision making can also be studied [25, 32], as
various factors such as content knowledge, scenario com-
plexity, environment, time of the day, experience etc. can
be controlled to certain degree.
In this pilot study, we investigate the relative occur-
rence of selected cognitive errors amongst doctors in
their first post-graduate year, using high fidelity clinical
simulation as a tool.
Besides cognitive errors, the changes in teamwork and
leadership skills were also assessed during the first post
graduate year; as this is one of the main learning objec-
tives of the existing simulation program.
Methods
The study involved review of intern (PGY1) simulation
sessions conducted in year 2014 at Flinders medical
centre, South Australia. The study was approved by
Southern Adelaide Clinical Human Research Ethics
Committee (91.15).
Simulation program
Simulation involved high-fidelity scenarios, using the
SimMan simulator (Laerdal Medical, Wappingers Falls,
NY, USA), and actors (trained simulation centre staff )
representing other team members (surgeon, nurse, medi-
cal emergency registrar etc.). Each session started with
briefing, followed by simulation and a debriefing session.
Video assisted debriefing [CAE LearningSpace™ (CAE
Healthcare, Canada)] was used with focus on technical
skills, teamwork and leadership. The predominant
debriefing style involved advocacy inquiry [33]. This
involves pairing observations of participant’s actions
(or inaction) with inquiry into participants’ thought
processes during that moment.
The four simulation scenarios chosen for study were–(A)
acute onset breathlessness in a post-operative knee surgery
patient, secondary to cardiogenic pulmonary edema; (B)
pain in abdomen and dizziness in a day 1 post hemi-
colectomy patient who has deteriorating hypovolemic
shock (covert to overt), secondary to intra-abdominal
bleeding; (C) low-conscious state in a trauma patient
secondary to narcotic overdose resulting from a pre-
scription error, and (D) low-conscious state due to
hypoglycaemia in a fasting diabetic patient awaiting
surgery, where regular insulin dose was not withheld
(Appendix). These scenarios were developed from ac-
tual incidents in hospital for learning purposes. In each
quarter of internship year, the interns were exposed to
one of the four scenarios. The sequence of exposure to
these scenarios over the year was random. Each simula-
tion scenario began with the nurse calling the doctor to
see the unwell patient. Towards the end of session, the
senior help (usually an ICU or admitting consultant)
enters and requests a handover from the team.
Think-aloud: In think-aloud studies, people are asked
to verbalize their thinking while performing tasks [34].
Researchers using this technique typically both observe
and audiotape or videotape the participant [35]. Although
it is often used, the technique is not entirely undisputed
and there is some criticism in literature that thinking
aloud and the limited capacity of memory may hinder the
cognitive processes of the participant, thus affecting per-
formance [36–38]. On the other hand, there is broad sup-
port for it as well, and it is often seen as the only available
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‘next best thing’ to–the currently impossible–‘direct ob-
servation’ of thought processes [39]. An alteration to the
conventional ‘think-aloud’ protocol is the use of ‘verbal
probing techniques’ [40]. Immediately following a particu-
lar response, questions (probes), are asked to help reveal
the thought process [41]. Investigators have previously
found that asking post-process questions to subjects pro-
vided valuable information that made think aloud data
easier to understand and interpret [42, 43].
The participants in our study were not given instruc-
tions beforehand to verbalize their thoughts. Instead
their thought process was probed (prompts) by the pa-
tient, the nurse and the ‘senior help’ to help reveal their
thoughts during simulation. Prompts by the patient were
initiated when the participant appeared to have gathered
initial patient data i.e. history and physical exam.
Prompts such as “what’s wrong with me doctor?” and
“what does that mean?” were used to get insight into
working differentials and participant’s understanding of
pathophysiology and synthesis from the clinical data.
The prompts from the nurse involved “what are you
thinking?” and “why do you think so?”. These prompts
were initiated if the participant initiated treatments
without verbalizing the diagnosis or clinical problem or
the participant verbalizes the diagnosis without the basis
for it. The processing framework for think-aloud data
was similar to that described previously [44]. Verbal data
was transcribed and broken down into smaller compo-
nents by predefined codes such as signs, symptoms, action,
treatment, labs, monitoring. Scripts were then analysed to
ascertain relationship between codes and identification of
inductive and deductive reasoning processes.
Towards the end of session, the senior help arrived
and asked the participants to verbalize their assessment
of the situation and actions, along with the basis for it. If
the participants were not correct with the diagnosis, they
were asked if there could be other differentials and what
were the findings for and against each differential. By
comparing responses against checklist of key expecta-
tions, this interview process allowed for gaining an esti-
mate about their knowledge around pertinent diagnoses
and management. For example, the participant was iden-
tified to have adequate knowledge if he/she was aware of
bradypnoea, hypothermia and pin-point pupils, and use
of naloxone as a part of narcotic toxodrome diagnosis
and management respectively.
Recording of cognitive errors
For pragmatic reasons, only selected cognitive errors
(Table 1) were studied, of the more than 30 reported in
literature [8]. The basis for selecting these was the
prevalence as reported in previous studies [45], minimal
overlap in theoretical construct, coverage of both diag-
nosis synthesis and treatment decisions and feasibility of
studying them based on video review of simulation ses-
sions. The simulation scenarios were developed to focus
on technical skills (diagnosis and treatment) and non-
technical skills of teamwork and leadership.
To identify the occurrence of cognitive errors, two in-
vestigators (SP and SB) independently analysed the video
recording and ‘think aloud’ comments from participants
[CAE LearningSpace™ (CAE Healthcare, Canada)]. The
observations were recorded using a Likert scale based
questionnaire tool (Table 2). This questionnaire was
adapted from a previously published questionnaire [45],
which was used in a similar context of simulated in-
hospital acutely sick patient. The assessors, similar to
our study, were trained and had expertise in the field.
Also, the questionnaire was demonstrated to be reliable
(Cronbach’s α 0.81). Both the investigators have expert-
ise in the management of critically ill patients and
underwent training at using this questionnaire, which in-
volved (i) familiarising themselves with the theoretical
constructs of cognitive errors and the questionnaire, (ii)
going through published examples of such cognitive
errors, (iii) observing 10 randomly selected simulation
sessions and applying questionnaire and discussing
Table 1 Catalogue of cognitive errors used in this study [45]
1. Anchoring Tendency to fixate on a specific feature
of a presentation early in the diagnostic
process at the expense of understanding
whole situation.
2. Confirmation Bias Seeking or acknowledging only information
that confirms the desired or suspected
diagnosis. As new information is available
there is a tendency to select out information
which supports initial hypothesis, rather
than adjusting the initial hypothesis in the
light of new information against the
initial hypothesis.
3. Premature Closure Accepting a diagnosis prematurely, failure
to consider reasonable differential of
possibilities. There is an obvious halt to
the diagnostic process targeted
at differentials.
4. Search satisfying Once a diagnosis is made, there may be
a tendency to stop searching for co-existing
diagnoses or causes and complications of
current diagnosis.
5. Commission bias Tendency toward action rather than inaction.
Performing un-indicated manoeuvres,
deviating from protocol. May be due to
overconfidence, desperation, or pressure
from others.
6. Omission bias Hesitation to start emergency manoeuvres
for fear of being wrong or causing harm,
tendency towards inaction.
7. Overconfidence Tendency to act on incomplete information,
intuitions or hunches. Too much faith is
placed in opinion instead of carefully
gathered evidence. Often reluctant accept
suggestions to consider alternatives.
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differences if any and (iv) discussing how in each of the
four study scenarios, the specific cognitive error may
manifest. While both the investigators were aware of the
main study objective of feasibility, one investigator (SB)
was blinded to other research questions. The investiga-
tors indicated whether or not a particular cognitive error
was made by a given participant using a five point Likert
scale, with the following anchors: ‘Strongly disagree’;
‘Disagree’; ‘Neutral/Unsure’; ‘Agree’; ‘Strongly agree’. The
theoretical construct of cognitive errors obtained from
previous publication allowed for two items per error,
without increasing the risk of redundancy, cognitive load
and fatigue on the assessors, while still preserving the
face validity. Anchoring was reflected by questions 2 and
9, commission by questions 3 and 10, confirmation by
questions 6 and 13, overconfidence by questions 4 and
11, omission by questions 1 and 8, premature closure by
questions 5 and 12, and search satisfying by questions 7
and 14. For each cognitive error, the scores were aver-
aged to develop final score that reflected three final
outcomes–‘Present’, ‘absent’ and ‘can’t be assessed or
unsure’. A cognitive error was considered as either
present or absent, if both the assessors agreed. The out-
come was ‘unsure/can’t be assessed’ if marked by both
the assessors as ‘unsure/can’t be assessed’ or there was
difference in marking.
Recording of non-technical skills
The non-technical skills were evaluated using previously
validated, Ottawa Crisis Resource Management Global
Rating Scale (Ottawa GRS) [46, 47]. The Ottawa GRS is
divided into five categories of crisis resource manage-
ment (CRM) skills based on recognized CRM literature:
problem solving, situational awareness, leadership, re-
source utilization and communication. An overall rating
category for CRM performance is also provided. Each
category is measured on a seven-point anchored ordinal
scale with descriptive anchors to provide guidelines on
alternating points along the scale.
Statistical methods
Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used. The
results are presented using tables and graphs. Data is
presented as median and Interquartile range (IQR), un-
less otherwise specified. Prevalence of cognitive errors is
reported as a ratio of number of observed error type to
total number of scenarios. Normality was assessed using
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Associations between categori-
cal and continuous variables were assessed using Chi-
square test and Spearman’s Rho respectively. The relation-
ship of delay in diagnosis and time spent in internship,
with the occurrence of cognitive error, was studied after
adjusting for scenario type, using generalized linear
modelling and logistic regression. Time to diagnosis
(dependent variable) across scenario types (factor variable)
was compared using one way ANOVA. Trends in Ottawa
GRS score over the PGY1 year was assessed using the
Friedman test. The internal consistency and inter-rater
agreement (for the final outcomes of ‘Present’, ‘absent’ and
‘can’t be assessed or unsure’) of questionnaire tool for
assessment of cognitive errors was analysed using
Cronbach’s alpha and Kappa statistic respectively. The
thresholds for Cronbach’s alpha [48] and Kappa statistic
[49] were 0.7 and 0.6 respectively. Analysis was performed
using SPSS version 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA).
For all tests, a two-sided P value of less than 0.05 was
considered significant.
Results
A total of 70 simulation sessions were reviewed over the
year 2014. A total of 25 interns participated in these ses-
sions as primary responder. There were 17 sessions each
of cardiogenic pulmonary oedema, narcotic overdose
and hypoglycaemia, and 19 sessions of haemorrhagic
shock.
Performance of questionnaire
The inter-rater agreement and internal consistency
was good for all cognitive errors assessed, except
‘overconfidence’ (Cronbach’s alpha 0.46; Kappa statis-
tic 0.17 for overconfidence).
Table 2 Questionnaire tool to assess cognitive errors
1 Initiated critical treatments in a timely manner and at
appropriate dose or extent
2 Does not allocate attention to all presenting issues
3 Treatments initiated which were not indicated based on
established emergency procedures (desperation, “try anything”)
4 Requires prompting to call for help/resources or refuses to
call upon prompting
5 Did not consider a thorough differential diagnosis
6 Tried to “make” new data/information fit a diagnosis
7 Once diagnosis is made searches for all causes of diagnosis.
For eg. Does not stop searching for other fentanyl patches
when one patch found.
8 Recognition of problem is promptly followed by intervention
9 Became focused on one issue at the expense of fully
understanding the situation
10 Treatments initiated or actions undertaken which were not
necessary
11 Initiated treatments at inappropriate dose without
checking/confirming/consulting
12 Tendency to anchor on to salient feature early in the
diagnosis process
13 Did not alter the diagnosis when hints were provided by
nurse or patient to alternative diagnosis
14 Once diagnosis is made searches for all complications of
the diagnosis
Prakash et al. BMC Medical Education  (2017) 17:36 Page 4 of 12
Overall prevalence of cognitive errors
Total number of studied cognitive errors observed per
session ranged from 0 to 5, with a median (IQR) of 3
(2–4) errors per session. Frequent cognitive errors, ob-
served in more than 75% of sessions, included search
satisfying (90%), followed by premature closure (78.6%),
and anchoring (75.7%) (Fig. 1). No instances of overcon-
fidence were identified. The uncertainty was most fre-
quent in the assessment of omission bias; whereas it was
least frequent in the assessment of anchoring and search
satisfying.
Impact of occurrence of cognitive errors on diagnosis
synthesis
The correct diagnosis was reached in 57 (85.1%) sessions,
with a median (IQR) time of 4.05 (2.3–6) minutes. The
scenarios differed in time to reach diagnosis (P = 0.04).
After adjusting for the scenario type, anchoring ap-
peared to be significantly associated with delay in diag-
noses (β = 0.2, 95% CI 0.5 to 3.0, P = 0.007) and also
occurrence of premature closure (x2 = 9.4, P = 0.005).
There was a trend towards negative association between
occurrence of confirmation bias and the ability to make a
correct diagnosis (x2 = 5.8, P = 0.05).
Occurrence of cognitive errors with time spent in
internship
As shown in Table 3, there was no association of occur-
rence of particular cognitive error with scenario type,
except for omission bias. After adjusting for scenario
type, the odds of occurrence of various cognitive errors
did not change with time spent in the internship year
(Table 3).
Other non-technical skills
There was overall improvement of OTTAWA GRS scores
during the internship period (x2 = 11.9, P = 0.01) (Fig. 2). As
shown in Fig. 2, there was improvement in skills involving
leadership (x2 = 28, P < 0.001), problem solving (x2 = 8.1,
P = 0.04), resource utilization (x2 = 19.7, P < 0.001) and
communication skills (x2 = 19.4, p < 0.001). No significant
trend was seen in situational awareness (x2 = 1.9, P = 0.6).
Review of interview between ‘senior help’ and the partici-
pant revealed that although all participants had knowledge
of clinical presentation of these diagnoses/syndromes,
there were frequent deficits in the knowledge around
management.
Discussion
Our study shows that cognitive errors are highly preva-
lent amongst junior doctors in their first post-graduate
year, particularly anchoring, premature closure and
search satisfying. Although junior doctors’ clinical ex-
perience increased during the year leading to a signifi-
cant improvement of their non-technical skills of
teamwork and leadership, there was no change in the
occurrence of studied cognitive errors. This is unfortu-
nate because we also found that anchoring and con-
firmation bias did not only impact on the ability to
make a diagnosis, but also resulted in a delay in making
a diagnosis. Moreover, anchoring was associated with
premature closure.
Fig. 1 Overall prevalence of cognitive errors
Prakash et al. BMC Medical Education  (2017) 17:36 Page 5 of 12
Observed cognitive errors and their impact on diagnosis
synthesis
The most frequent cognitive errors were ‘anchoring’,
‘premature closure’ and ‘search satisfying’. Anchoring
was significantly associated with delay in reaching a
correct diagnosis and premature closure. Anchoring
represents the tendency to fixate on the hypothesis
generated from a specific feature of a presentation early
in the diagnostic process, at the expense of understanding
the whole situation. Recovery from this initial anchor
Table 3 Association of cognitive errors with scenario types and odds of their occurrence with increasing internship time exposure
Cognitive error Association with scenario type Odds of occurrence with increasing internship time exposure
x2 P value OR (95% CI) P value
Search satisfying 0.47 0.9 1.2 (0.89;1.7) 0.21
Premature closure 2.0 0.57 0.75 (0.52;1.08) 0.12
Anchoring 2.4 0.4 0.84 (0.66;1.07) 0.15
Commission 3.4 0.3 0.99 (0.75;1.33) 0.91
Confirmation bias 2.2 0.52 1.02 (0.68;1.55) 0.91
Omission bias 10.3 0.02 1.3 (0.94;1.9) 0.11
Fig. 2 The Ottawa GRS score for non-technical skills across four quarters during the internship year
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involves ‘adjusting’ to more appropriate diagnosis, by
seeking additional data for and against the diagnostic hy-
pothesis generated from the initial feature [50]. This is
therefore likely to delay reaching correct diagnosis by the
adjusting process [50], either rendered insufficient by
premature closure, or flawed by confirmation bias. In con-
firmation bias, time is spent to recruit selective informa-
tion to reinforce the initial impression that might have
been generated due to anchoring; in which case, the cor-
rect diagnosis may not be even considered. The occur-
rence of confirmation bias becomes more likely when the
information is presented sequentially, as is usually the case
in clinical medicine [51]. This also reinforces the value of
high-fidelity patient simulation for studying cognitive er-
rors over case notes or computer screen-based tools,
where the information is available upfront. The highly
prevalent search satisfying by definition resulted in high
incidence of failure to search for causes or contributing
factors, complications and co-existing diagnoses. Attempts
at identifying these are likely to result in more successful
and effective management.
Overconfidence bias was not observed in our study.
This is contrary to findings in the literature of consider-
able prevalence [12]. However, susceptibility to overcon-
fidence bias may vary with seniority and may actually be
low in fresh medical graduates, as supported by findings
of Friedman et al. [52].
Despite the high prevalence of cognitive errors, the
correct diagnosis was considered in majority of sessions.
This is perhaps not as illogical as it seems: heuristics
and biases that may underlie these errors, evolve over
time to help perform under circumstances of uncertainty
and high cognitive load, and hence they may not be
always associated with poor outcome [53]. Also some of
the cognitive errors studied may not impact diagnostic
accuracy, but may influence the choices in management,
eg. search satisfying may lead to missed co-diagnoses or
complications. Increase in complexity of case, temporal
demand or fatigue may uncover the potentially harmful
effects of biases or cognitive dispositions. Besides these
possibilities, it has also been shown that even if the cor-
rect diagnosis appears as one of the differentials, it is
rarely rejected during the diagnostic process [54].
High fidelity simulation as a research and teaching tool
Our pilot study is one of the first that demonstrates the
feasibility of immersive high-fidelity clinical simulations
to study cognitive errors, combined with a think aloud
technique and a questionnaire based tool. This is a step
forwards from previous studies utilizing predominantly
case notes or computer screen based tools to study
cognitive errors. Our study demonstrated the utility of
simulation in eliciting how they may negatively impact
clinical performance such as diagnosis synthesis and
treatment decisions. Guided reflection here is likely to
help develop catalogue of examples of situations where
the potentially harmful effects of biases or cognitive dis-
positions may occur (exemplar theory [55]) and also mo-
tivate participants to learn (motivation theory [56]).
There was a significant improvement in teamwork and
leadership skills. The efficacy of simulation based training
for these skills have been demonstrated extensively in lite-
rature [57]. Similarly, focused simulation based training
could help doctors to recognize and manage situations
where they are at risk for cognitive errors. The applied
psychology concepts, common to simulation based
learning, of metacognition and ‘de-biasing’ strategies
have been demonstrated in other fields to be effective
in cognitive error prevention and recovery [58–61].
In the absence of formal training, clinical experience is
often relied on to mitigate cognitive errors. In our study, 1
year of clinical experience did not appear to influence the
occurrence of various cognitive errors. It is unlikely that
the context of scenarios alone would have yielded this re-
sult as: (i) the sequence of scenarios were not fixed, (ii) the
pattern of occurrence of cognitive errors across scenarios
was largely similar and (iii) we adjusted for scenario type
in the regression analysis. Since the study was not de-
signed for this research question, the finding can only be
regarded as hypothesis generating, to be tested in a larger
prospective study. In support of this finding, however, is a
prospective observation study which revealed that the
clinical reasoning process remains relatively constant from
medical school entry to practice [62]. Also, the high preva-
lence of cognitive errors amongst speciality trainees and
practicing physicians suggests that experienced clinicians
are as likely as junior colleagues to experience adverse
cognitive dispositions or biases [63, 64]. There could be
few reasons as to why clinical experience alone may not
suffice as a remedy for cognitive errors. Firstly, the out-
comes in real life may not be immediately visible and sec-
ondly, the learning that occurs from experience require
unbiased and informed reflection (Kolb’s experiential
theory) [65] on what cognitive errors are and how they
can impair clinical performance. Observing clinicians dur-
ing their work to enhance experiential learning around
cognitive errors has ethical limitations as the error would
need to be interrupted or ideally avoided, so that the pa-
tient is not harmed. Here simulation based learning may
be beneficial as the errors can be allowed to evolve and
serve as a learning catalyst.
Resources involved in delivering high fidelity simulation
based teaching
Simulation based teaching intervention can be resource in-
tensive, and there is limited data in literature. Lapkin et al.
reported that marginal cost of high fidelity simulation
Prakash et al. BMC Medical Education  (2017) 17:36 Page 7 of 12
amounted to $ 291.26 per participant [66]. For our simula-
tion based teaching, we used the resource cost model to es-
timate the cost [67]. There is one time cost of setting up of
simulation facility which also includes purchase and instal-
lation of Mannequin, simulation software and computers.
There are also recurring costs, of which the significant ones
include equipment and materials, and personnel cost.
Under our business model, the simulation based activity in
the current project was a part of a larger simulation and
clinical skills programme, used for training of medical stu-
dents, post graduate doctors, nurses and allied staff. Hence
the above costs which otherwise are significant (approxi-
mately $200,000) would be distributed across several
teaching programs. Similarly, the cost involved in scenario
development and programming was about $364.62 per
scenario (6 h–$60.08/h). This cost again would be distrib-
uted across 30 to 40 participants each year, thereby signifi-
cantly reducing the cost per participant. Per participant,
the personnel cost involved in simulation based teaching
was $157 (0.5 h nursing time, 0.6 h of 2 medical facilita-
tors and 0.3 h technical and administrative time).
Limitations and future research
We used retrospective study design which allowed for
assessment of authentic performance of participants and
their thought process using think-aloud transcripts.
Although we were able to control for uncertainty, a pro-
spective study using direct interview may help minimize
uncertainty in assessment and also further validate the
questionnaire based tool. The inter-rater agreement and
internal consistency in assessment of Overconfidence
was poor. This is likely to be highly skewed observations
towards absence of Overconfidence.
Although, the assessors were well trained for making
observations, there is no independent corroboration of as-
sessor’s observations. Also only one of the two assessors
was blinded to the research questions. Although this may
have not affected the main objective of the study, it may
impact on specific hypothesis testing. In future studies, it
is essential that the assessors are blinded to the hypothesis
being tested.
We used modified think-aloud technique using verbal
probes. Although such technique allows for more focused
information gathering, while minimizing interruptions, it
can potentially introduce bias. Certain probe questions can
be perceived as a cue to reconsider their thoughts/deci-
sions. Despite their usefulness, unfortunately both conven-
tional think-aloud technique and verbal probing have
inherent shortcomings which are difficult to overcome
[36–38]. Besides think aloud technique, there are other
methods such as script concordance approach [68] and
post-hoc cognitive walkthroughs [69] using video re-
view, which may be trialled in future studies.
Cognitive errors were detected based on outcome
measures, which could have been influenced by factors
such as knowledge deficit. Since our assessment revealed
deficits in knowledge around management of the simu-
lated syndromes/diagnoses, some of these encountered
errors may have originated from lack of knowledge,
such as omission bias. This highlights the importance
of assessment of the relevant content knowledge of
participants, in order to better assess the origin of ob-
served cognitive error. This is important to know, as inter-
ventions would differ. We did not have pre-defined
standardized framework for assessment. Hence, although
there was flexibility to modify assessment to the context,
scenario and participant; this resulted in heterogeneity in
assessment technique. A pre-formulated structured as-
sessment framework will allow uniformity in assess-
ment and needs to be trialled in a prospective study.
The results of our study need to be triangulated with a
larger prospective study on cognitive errors using immer-
sive high fidelity simulation as a tool. Also by controlling
for various factors such as complexity of scenario, cognitive
load, participant experience etc., and more objective assess-
ment of participant knowledge base, it needs to be deter-
mined as to how and under what circumstances the
cognitive dispositions or biases result in negative outcome.
This is likely to provide essential evidence to facilitate stud-
ies into how simulation based education could be used to
train doctors to avoid, identify and recover from cognitive
errors.
Conclusions
Our study demonstrated a high prevalence of anchoring,
premature closure, and search satisfying amongst doctors
in their 1st postgraduate year. The clinical experience
gained during their first post graduate year and simulation
based training focused on teamwork and leadership was
associated with acquisition of these skills. However, there
was no change in the prevalence of various cognitive
errors. Further prospective research is needed to validate
the results and explore the utility of simulation based
intervention to help doctors manage their cognitive errors
to improve clinical reasoning.
Appendix
Details of scenarios with examples of cognitive errors.
Scenario A: cardiogenic pulmonary edema
Clinical problem: Acute onset breathlessness in a post-
operative knee surgery patient. Participant expected to
manage acutely sick patient and work through differen-
tials of sudden onset breathlessness.
Story and setting: The doctor is summoned by the
bedside nurse to assess an elderly patient who is 3 days
post knee replacement. He is in an orthopaedic ward,
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and develops sudden onset shortness of breath at rest.
He has significant hypoxia and tachypnoea, which poorly
responds to high oxygen delivery via non-rebreather
mask. He is anxious, diaphoretic and cyanosed. He does
not tolerate lying down. On auscultation the participant
finds bilateral wheeze, basal crepts on lung auscultation
and gallop rhythm on cardiac auscultation. He has cool
peripheries but with strong pulse. He is in fast atrial fibril-
lation and is significantly hypertensive (BP systolic ~
210 mmHg). There is no calf swelling/fever and operative
site appears unremarkable, except for tenderness. He does
not have chest pain but complains of tightness and diffi-
culty breathing. He is not a diabetic, but does have a his-
tory of ischemic heart disease. He is one DVT prophylaxis
and anti-platelet agents. During assessment, the patient at
one instance coughs up pink frothy secretions.
Examples of cognitive traps:
Scenario B: hypovolemic shock secondary to bleeding
Clinical problem: Pain in abdomen and dizziness in a
day 1 post hemi-colectomy patient who has deteriorating
hypovolemic shock (covert to overt) secondary to intra-
abdominal bleeding.
Story and setting: The doctor is summoned by the bed-
side nurse to assess an elderly patient who is day 1, post
hemi-colectomy and is complaining of abdominal pain
poorly responding to ordered analgesics and dizziness. The
patient is awake, anxious and diaphoretic. She complains of
pain in the upper abdomen which is dull and poorly local-
ized. The abdomen seems to be distended. The patient does
have surgical drain which has poured out significant blood
in the past 2 h, and also the patient has urinary catheter
with poor urine output, but this information needs to be
actively sought by the assessor (As the nurse is unaware of
this). The patient’s blood pressure is normal initially but
has sinus tachycardia, with cold peripheries and poor capil-
lary refill. If the haemorrhagic shock is not recognized and
managed appropriately, the patient’s condition deteriorates
with narrowing of pulse pressure, followed by overt
hypotension. In a completely neglected case, pulseless elec-
trical activity ensues. If blood tests done, reveals low
haemoglobin.
Examples of cognitive traps:
CDR Scenario specific examples
Anchoring The participant displays a tendency to fixate
on ECG changes/possibility of DVT/Bilateral
wheezing and possibility of acute asthma
early on in their workup.
Premature closure Given the history of knee surgery, the participants
commonly display premature closure with diagnosis
of pulmonary embolism.
Search satisfying Once recognizing the pattern of cardiogenic
pulmonary edema, the participants either
stop searching for likely causes or stop
beyond the likelihood of ischemic cardiac event.
Confirmation When thinking of pulmonary embolism,
they display tendency to interpret post-operative
knee pain as a feature of DVT and pink
frothy secretions as ‘haemoptysis’ of pulmonary
embolism. They then display tendency to
ignore features against, such as orthopnoea,
hypertension, and auscultation findings.
Overconfidence Ignoring suggestion for calling for help by
the nurse, despite deteriorating condition.
Making guesses on medication dosage,
despite available option of checking.
Commission On deterioration, tendency to lie the patient
down, despite marked orthopnoea. Tendency
to commence IV fluid/administer fluid bolus,
despite hypertension.
Omission Despite, marked hypoxia, commencing
oxygen delivery at very low rate
(eg 2–4 L/min nasal specks) and then
tendency to not escalate it further.
Despite acknowledging very high blood pressure,
not commencing treatment interventions.
CDR Scenario specific examples
Anchoring The participants often anchor onto control of pain as
the main issue. Also upper abdominal pain results in
anchor into acute coronary syndrome. Some
participants anchor onto abdominal distention with
concerns of bowel distention and resort to placement
of naso-gastric tube as a priority. All these examples
involve failure to fully assess, gather all information
and synthesizing the bigger picture. Another example
would be recognizing low blood pressure and fixating
on it using repeated fluid challenges, rather than
working through the cause and treating it.
Premature
closure
Post-operative ileus, myocardial infarction and
analgesic management are examples of diagnoses,
associated with failure to think through other possibilities.
Search satisfying Once the haemorrhagic shock was recognized, there
was failure to search for cause and complications.
Example, efforts to look for anti-platelet agents or
anti-coagulation, renal failure, hypothermia, medications
causing low BP etc.
Confirmation An example would be actively seeking abdominal
x-ray and placement of nasogastric tube for abdominal
distention, despite recognizing evolving shock and
bleeding from the surgical drain.
Overconfidence Ignoring suggestion for calling for help by the nurse,
despite deteriorating condition. Making guesses on
medication dosage, despite available option of checking.
Commission Upon deteriorating using bag mask ventilation, despite
patient breathing by herself. Some even elected to use
GTN with the premature closure around myocardial
infarction, despite the evolving shock.
Omission Not commencing fluid bolus, or not giving fluid bolus
beyond the initial bolus, or hesitancy in commencing
bolus and only commencing slow infusion despite
marked hypotension. Another example is not asking
for blood transfusion despite noticing blood in the
post-surgical drain.
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Scenario C: narcotic overdose
Clinical problem: low-conscious state in a trauma pa-
tient secondary to narcotic overdose resulting from pre-
scription error.
Story and setting: The doctor is summoned by the
nurse to assess this patient who is difficult to arouse.
The patient was admitted last evening following a fall.
He has bruise on his head and has fracture of his right
wrist. He is due operation for his broken wrist later in
the day. Last evening had a head CT which was normal
(this information is available, if the participant asks for).
He has two fentanyl patches which he applied himself
before coming to hospital. Also there is duplication of
opioid prescription (this information has to be actively
sought by the participant, as the nurse is unaware). The
patient has signs of opioid overdose–pinpoint pupils,
low respiratory rate, low heart rate, and low body
temperature. The participant is expected to work
through causes of low conscious state, detect opioid
toxodrome and treat accordingly.
Examples of cognitive traps:
Scenario D: hypoglycaemia
Clinical problem: low-conscious state due to hypo-
glycaemia in a fasting diabetic patient awaiting surgery,
where regular insulin dose was not withheld.
Story and setting: The doctor is summoned by the
nurse to assess this elderly patient who is confused
and more somnolent. The patient was admitted last
evening following a knife injury to her hand. Over-
night, she has been having pain issues, needing analge-
sics (including opioids). The patient is due tendon
repair operation this morning and has been fasting for
the same. Despite fasting, the patient got given insulin
overnight (this info was not known to nurse and has
to be sought by the participant). The patient is se-
verely hypoglycaemic. The participant was expected to
work through causes of low conscious state, detect
hypoglycaemia and it’s cause and treat accordingly.
Examples of cognitive traps:
Abbreviations
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CDR Scenario specific examples
Anchoring The participant had a tendency to anchor
on the bruise and fixate on possibility of
head injury. Other examples include anchoring
on low sinus heart rate and focusing on
workup for causes of sinus bradycardia, rather
than looking at the bigger picture and
synthesising the probability of narcotic
overdose.
Premature closure Premature closure was often seen around
the diagnosis of head injury.
Search satisfying Once opioid toxodrome was recognized,
efforts were not made to identify the cause
such as the additional fentanyl patch and
duplication of opioid order. Other causes
were not looked for/excluded such as
electrolyte imbalance, hypoglycaemia other
drug overdose.
Confirmation Asking for another head CT, looking at the
bruise. This was despite negative head
CT 12 h back.
Overconfidence Ignoring suggestion for calling for help by
the nurse, despite deteriorating condition.
Making guesses on medication dosage,
despite available option of checking.
Commission Upon deteriorating using bag mask
ventilation, despite patient breathing by
herself. Using atropine to increase heart rate.
Using fluid bolus despite normal blood
pressure.
Omission Not using naloxone or hesitancy to re-administer
or commence naloxone infusion.
CDR Scenario specific examples
Anchoring The participant had a tendency to fixate on
confusion in elderly in the setting of pain.
Some had a tendency to fixate on opioid use
and some on the nature of wound injury and
possibility of sepsis.
Premature closure Premature closure was often seen around the
clinical syndromes of delirium, dementia,
opioid toxodrome
Search satisfying Once hypoglycaemia was detected, efforts
were not made to find out the cause
(prescription error) and hence prevention of
further hypoglycaemia.
Confirmation Despite no response to naloxone or no history
of dementia and in a 12 h clean wound,
persistent efforts to explore opioid, psychiatric
and sepsis hypothesis
Overconfidence Ignoring suggestion for calling for help by
the nurse, despite deteriorating condition.
Commission Upon deteriorating using bag mask ventilation,
despite patient breathing by herself. Using fluid
bolus despite normal blood pressure.
Omission Despite noticing long acting insulin
prescription, failure to hold that prescription
and commencement of dextrose infusion to
prevent recurrence.
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